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 ABSTRACT 
With the 1995 Agreement on Trade - related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS), a centralised rule - system for the international governance of 
patents was put in place under the general framework of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). Since then, the number of patent – related institutions 
has increased monotonically on the multilateral, plurilateral and bilateral 
levels. I will explain this case of institutional change by focusing on the norm 
– setting activities of both industrialised and developing countries, arguing 
that both groups constitute internally highly cohesive coalitions in global 
patent politics, while institutional change occurs when both coalitions 
engage in those negotiating settings in which they enjoy a comparative 
advantage over the other coalition. Specifically, I make the point that 
industrialised countries’ norm – setting activities take place on the 
plurilateral and bilateral level, where economic factors can be effectively 
translated into political outcomes while simultaneously avoiding 
unacceptably high legitimacy costs; whereas developing countries, on the 
other hand, use various multilateral United Nations (UN) forums where their 
claims possess a high degree of legitimacy, but cannot translate into 
effective political outcomes. The paper concludes with some remarks on how 
this case yields new insights into ongoing debates in institutionalist 
International Relations (IR), as pertaining to present discussions on “regime 
complexity”. 
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1 Introduction 
The Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) formed part of the 1994 Marrakech Agreement 
constituting the World Trade Organisation (WTO), obliging WTO 
members to provide for a broad range of legal minimum standards in 
their respective national patent laws. TRIPS, in the following years, 
turned out to be a highly controversial issue. While developing 
countries increasingly claimed a wide range of negative socio-
economic impacts as a consequence of TRIPS, industrialised countries 
largely insisted on further scalling TRIPS’ minimum standards 
upwards. The years since 1995 have seen a remarkable, monotonic 
increase in the number of multi-, pluri- and bilateral forums that are to 
different degrees relevant to global patent governance. This entailed 
the emergence of new forums characterised by varying degrees of 
legalisation (Abbott et al., 2000), shifts in existing forums’ mandates, 
and finally (usually politically contested) re-definitions of issue areas. 
The pattern that has been emerging is that (largely) members of the 
Group of 77 (G77) have been shifting their political attention towards a 
broad number of multilateral institutions within the United Nations 
(UN) system, while (largely) Organisation of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) member states have begun engaging in norm- 
setting on the pluri- and bilateral levels. Institutional changes between 
1995 and 2013 have taken place within already existing institutions 
(where, i.e., mandates have been broadened to include certain patent–
related issues), but also a range of new and specialised institutions 
have emerged. 
 
This increase of patent–relevant institutions on various levels relates 
to larger discussions on the “fragmentation of international law” (ILC, 
2006; Koskenniemi and Leino, 2002), or what is sometimes referred to 
as increasing “institutional density”, “institutional proliferation” 
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(Raustiala, 2012) or “treaty congestion” (Hicks, 1998). My aim in this 
paper will be to explain why institutional change in global patent 
politics took the specific shape sketched out above and substantiated 
below. I am largely drawing on a scientific realist framework 
(Patomaeki and Wight, 2000), using an approach based on abduction. 
This mode of inference revolves around back-tracing an empirical 
phenomenon to its most likely necessary causes, “whereby a 
hypothesis is reasonably accepted if it is the best explanation of some 
phenomena or evidence that needs to be explained” (Psillos, 2007: 
257). 
 
The explanation I propose for explaining institutional change in global 
patent politics (GPP1) between 1995 and 2013 is that a combination of 
economic and normative factors has constituted two coalitions along 
the political North–South divide that are internally highly cohesive in 
terms of interests and identities, and which each have a context–
specific comparative advantage in terms of norm–setting. I will draw 
on the conceptual approach to power proposed by Barnett and Duvall 
(2004), arguing that industrialised and developing countries in GPP 
differ in their respective capabilities to draw on certain types of power. 
While industrialised countries draw on their comparative economic 
advantage (in terms of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) patterns, 
Intellectual Property (IP) trade flows, market size, etc.) to exercise 
“compulsory power” for inducing institutional change in GPP, 
developing countries are more adept at exercising “institutional 
power” within the UN system, where their claims enjoy high legitimacy 
and where the institutional framework gives them a structural 
advantage over industrialised countries. Based on this framework, I 
argue that the strategies the “North” and “South” coalitions have 
respectively adopted since 1995, in line with their different patent 
                                                
1 Under	  “global	  patent	  politics”	  I	  will	  understand	  those	  multi-­‐,	  pluri	  -­‐	  and	  bilateral	  norm	  -­‐	  setting	  activities	  that	  directly	  influence	  or	  might	  influence	  various	  aspects	  of	  the	  national	  patent	  law	  of	  participating	  countries.	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agendas, have induced institutional proliferation and change in those 
areas where they are holding a comparative advantage in the exertion 
of their respective compulsory and institutional power (Barnett and 
Duvall, 2004). 
 
I identify factors that, in their particular interaction, result in the 
formation of stable and cohesive coalitions in GPP in terms of interests 
and identities. Section 3 links different types of power to institutional 
change in GPP. Section 4 empirically applies my framework to 
coalition–based norm– setting on different levels between 1995 and 
2013. Section 5 will show what general insights might be drawn from 
this case in relation to the larger discussion on institutional 
proliferation and change. 
2 Interests and Identities in Global Patent Politics 
In this paper, I follow an abductive approach for explaining 
institutional change in GPP, thus back-tracing the empirical 
phenomenon to its deeper, underlying causes. This approach entails a 
“multifactorial and open-ended approach in which, while the causal 
status of multiple factors is accepted, the relative causal effects 
among the chosen factors are not predetermined” (Eun, 2012: 166). 
Accordingly, I adopt a pluralist methodology aimed at explaining the 
particular phenomenon at hand, while potential implications for 
theory-building will be addressed in the conclusion. 
 
At the core of the phenomenon of institutional change in GPP is, I 
argue, the emergence of the two internally cohesive and stable, but 
towards each other often strongly politicised coalitions of (largely) 
developing and industrialised countries, both with a respective 
comparative advantage in terms of norm– setting capacities in GPP. 
This process of coalition formation was largely due to the interaction 
of particular patent-related issues with more general political, 
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normative and economic issues in North–South relations. In this text, I 
will use the term “coalition” in a broad sense to refer to structures of 
both informal coordination and formal organisation between state 
actors that share a particular political agenda and are, between 
themselves, coherent in regard to interests and identities. 
Nevertheless, the term coalition is not to imply any kind of bloc 
politics, and it does not necessarily exclude the possibility that 
individual states will, from time to time, pursue policies that might be 
vastly at odds with other members of their respective coalition. 
However, I will use the somewhat strong term “coalition” to refer to 
rather coherent norm–setting activities across forums and levels that is 
based on a set of goals and norms that are widely shared between 
members of the respective coalition. 
 
This section will look into the factors driving interest and identity 
formation in GPP. The first part will deal with the economic geography 
of patents, that is, how economic patterns related to all kinds of 
patenting activity are, at a very elemental level, largely in line with the 
political dimension of the North–South split. The subsequent part will 
look into the normative debate on patenting as it has emerged during 
the 1990s. I argue that the combination of those (interlinked) 
economic and normative factors has significantly contributed to 
interest and identity formation along the North–South lines, a 
development obviously being re-enforced by much broader economic 
and normative aspects of North–South relations since the early 1990s. 
Nevertheless, I will primarily focus on the economic and normative 
dimensions specifically pertaining to patents, while making links to 
larger issues in North–South relations where necessary. 
 
2.1 The economic geography of patents 
The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) currently defines a 
patent as follows: 
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“A patent confers, by law, a set of exclusive rights to applicants for 
inventions that meet the standards of novelty, non-obviousness and 
industrial applicability. It is valid for a limited period of time (generally 
20 years), during which patent holders can commercially exploit their 
inventions on an exclusive basis. In return, applicants are obliged to 
disclose their inventions to the public so that others, skilled in the art, 
may replicate them” (WIPO, 2012: 41). 
 
The 1995 TRIPS agreement centrally prescribed a range of minimum 
standards in patents which are mandatory (and highly enforceable) 
towards WTO member states. That is, WTO members are obliged to 
harmonise their national patent systems in a number of ways. TRIPS 
does not constitute a global patent system, instead, patents are 
granted under national law, with some mechanisms (such as the 
European Patent Convention (EPC); or the WIPO’s Patent Cooperation 
Treaty (PCT)) providing for a bundle of national patents. Also, TRIPS 
does not harmonise national patent laws completely, though, rather 
leaving some safeguards and flexibilities to the discretion of national 
governments. 
 
Total annual patent applications have grown from about 1.1 million in 
1995 to about 2.1 million in 2011 (WIPO, 2012: 43). The so–called 
trilateral patent offices, that is, the EPO, the US Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) and the Japanese Patent Office (JPO) have traditionally 
been both the biggest source and the biggest recipient of patent 
application, due to their dominance in terms of innovation, and market 
size. Until around 2000, patent applications in other countries and 
regions were negligible. Since then, however, patent applications in 
the Republic of Korea and particularly in China leveled-off (WIPO, 
2012: 47). In recent years, patenting activities in JPO, USPTO and in 
the EPC have stagnated or declined, while the Chinese Intellectual 
Property Office (SIPO) has become, in terms of applications granted, 
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the biggest patent office in the world, growing at an average annual 
rate of 22% between 2008 and 2011; in comparison, the JPO, the 
USPTO and the EPO grew, on average, -4.3%, 3.3% and -0.8% 
respectively (WIPO, 2012: 5). Of the emerging economies, though, 
China is the exception rather than the rule, with India, Brazil and 
Mexico currently each attracting merely 1.9%, 1.1% and 0.7% of 
worldwide patent applications (WIPO, 2012: 5). 
 
Patenting activity is obviously strongly correlated to general economic 
developments. However, differentiating by resident vs. non-resident 
patent applications, a strong correlation holds between income levels 
and patenting activity. For high-income and upper middle-income 
countries, a majority of patent applications came from residents 
(61.8% and 73.2% respectively, as of 2011); at the same time, patent 
applications in lower middle - income and low - income countries 
primarily emerged from non-residents (78.8% and 89.5%) (WIPO, 2012: 
52). The exorbitant increase in Chinese patent activity since about 
2000 is linked to larger shifts in the global economy, in particular 
related to (other) emerging economies such as Brazil and India, but 
also South Africa, Indonesia or Turkey. This development is, at 
present, significantly blurring the traditional economic North–South 
divide. Emerging economies have for some years now been 
substantially increasing their share of global economic activity, which 
is also impacting patenting activity. Patent offices in upper middle-
income countries have been drawing an overproportional share of 
applications compared to other countries. Between 2008 and 2011, 
applications in those countries increased on average by 14.2% 
annually; for comparison, the same increases for high-income 
countries shrank by -0.3%, and by -38.5% for low- income countries 
(WIPO, 2012: 5). 
 
Although the global patent geography is shifting currently, particularly 
towards China, the political North–South divide is far from being 
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replaced. It is unclear whether recent (and currently diminishing) 
growth in most emerging economies will even translate into 
substantive patenting activity. Also, many developing countries simply 
do not see stringent patent protection based on mandatory 
international minimum standards as in their economic interest. India 
as the world’s largest exporter of generic medicines has a natural 
interest in not weakening its exports through agreeing to higher levels 
of patent protection (Thach and Marsnik, 2009). And for countries like 
Brazil and South Africa, high levels of patent protection have been 
linked to significant problems in public health and access to essential 
medicines in the past (see below). On the other hand, industrialised 
countries as the prime exporter of patent–protected products have a 
very strong interest in protecting their industries from competition by 
local imitators in developing countries, particularly in regard to 
electronic, pharmaceutical and agricultural products. Accordingly, 
industrialised countries have been repeatedly voicing concerns over 
patent infringements in (mainly) India and China, where products 
originating from industrialised countries are often reverse – 
engineered to be sold both domestically and internationally in 
violation of patent holders’ rights. 
2.2 Normative conflicts in Global Patent Politics 
The TRIPS agreement formed part of the package deal agreed upon 
within the Uruguay Round. Nevertheless, at the time, TRIPS was not 
considered a major component of the WTO agreement, with 
negotiations mainly focusing on tariffs and agricultural subsidies. The 
inclusion of patents in the Uruguay agenda, however, was by no 
means a necessary development, and resulted rather from politically 
created issue–linkages on behalf of the United States (US)–based IP 
industry (Muzaka, 2010). In the WTO context, patents and other IPRs 
are understood to be highly trade–relevant, in so far that only high 
levels of protection will induce sufficient technology transfer from 
North to South, absent the danger of IP theft by local imitators. 
  Florian Rabitz  
 
15 
There are a range of normative conflicts related to TRIPS since the 
mid– 1990s, which generally revolve around the notion of rather 
asymmetric pay– offs and negative impacts on developing countries by 
the agreement. By far the most salient issue has been the debate on 
public health and access to medicines, where it was quickly recognised 
that TRIPS can impede access to life–saving medicines in developing 
countries, where consumers do not have adequate levels of purchasing 
power while oligopolist price politics by industrialised countries’ 
pharmaceutical Multinational Corporations (MNCs) are largely 
protected by TRIPS. 
 
Before being amended in Doha 2001, TRIPS put rather extensive 
constraints on WTO member states that wished to restrict patent 
protection on certain life- saving medicines held by (usually) foreign-
owned companies. Particularly salient cases were a law–suit by a range 
of pharmaceuticals producers against the South African government, 
which had, in 1999, introduced legislation for improving access to 
medicines via parallel imports; a second case took place in 2001, 
when the US initiated a dispute settlement proceeding under the WTO 
against Brazil, which had since the 1990s been using compulsory 
licenses for improving access to antiretroviral treatments in light of 
the Brazilian HIV / AIDS pandemic (Hoen, 2002). 
 
Although the 2001 Doha Declaration made some noticeable changes 
in this matter, most notably significantly broadening WTO members’ 
discretion in issuing compulsory licenses while extending the deadline 
for TRIPS implementation in LDCs by another 10 years up to 2016. 
However, the overall efficacy of those measures in alleviating the 
access to medicine problem is put in doubt by some observers (Kerry 
and Lee, 2007; Sun, 2004). Even as of 2013, a legal dispute between 
German pharmaceutical manufacturer Bayer and the Government of 
India is ongoing on whether the latter’s issuance of a compulsory 
license for the anti-cancer drug Nexavar to the Indian pharmaceutical 
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Natco, resulting in a price drop from $5,500 / month to $175 / 
month, is in line with India’s legal obligations under TRIPS (IPW, 2013). 
The debate on public health and patents does not end there, though. 
Furthermore, it is claimed that the current global patent system is also 
partially responsible for global financial flows in pharmaceutical 
Research and Development (R&D) overwhelmingly focusing on 
diseases affecting affluent customers in the Global North. As a recent 
World Health Organisation (WHO) report states: 
 
“Type II diseases are incident in both rich and poor countries, but with 
a substantial proportion of the cases in the poor countries. R&D 
incentives exist in the rich country markets, therefore, but the level of 
R&D spending on a global basis is not commensurate with disease 
burden. [...] Type III diseases are those that are overwhelmingly or 
exclusively incident in the developing countries, such as African 
sleeping sickness (trypanosomiasis) and African river blindness 
(onchoceciasis). Such diseases receive extremely little R&D, and 
essentially no commercially based R&D in the rich countries” (WHO, 
2001:78). 
 
Besides negatively affecting public health in many developing 
countries, this debate has obviously a strong normative component. 
With the possibility of creating direct causal linkages between 
pharmaceutical pricing politics from multinational corporations based 
in the Global North and increased (and avoidable) mortality rates in 
developing countries, the problem fits well into the larger discourses 
on North–South equity and neo–colonialism as they emerged from the 
early 1990s. 
 
This is also the case in another issue area which has been highly 
normatively charged in the post–TRIPS environment, that is, the 
misappropriation and misuse of genetic resources found (mainly) 
within developing countries by (mainly) Northern MNCs, which then 
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proceed to protect innovations resulting from these resources with 
patents, a practice that is commonly called “biopiracy” (Mgbeoji, 2006; 
Shiva, 1999). Besides the legal dimension of this practice, which is 
often somewhat in a grey area under international law, the normative 
dimension is similar, and fits well into the larger discourse on 
economic exploitation of developing countries by industrialised ones. 
Compared to the issue of access to medicines, the normative aspect of 
biopiracy is probably much higher than its economic ones. Whereas 
the impacts of TRIPS on access to medicines has obviously a 
measurable economic impact on public health, the precise economic 
impacts of biopiracy, i.e. in terms of opportunity costs, are completely 
unclear at the moment. That is, while a number of thoroughly 
documented and highly mediatised cases of biopiracy exist (Robinson, 
2010), there are virtually no assessments of the total economic 
impact, or even approximate numbers of the prevalence of the 
phenomenon, a problem that is obviously confounded by biopiracy 
being (at best) a legally dubious practice. While the overall geo-
economic impacts of biopiracy are thus totally unknown right now, the 
issue has consistently been framed within the context of North–South 
equity and neo–colonialism. In the absence of virtually any hard 
evidence on the impacts of biopiracy on North– South economic 
relations, the issue is rather a normative one, contributing further to 
identity formation in GPP. 
3 Power, Legitimacy and Institutional Change 
The above section has shown how normative and economic factors in 
GPP combine in constituting identities and interests of coalitions along 
the North – South line. This section will elaborate an analytical 
framework for explaining institutional change in GPP as resulting from 
different comparative advantages in terms of norm–setting by 
industrialised and developing countries respectively. I will adopt the 
rather broad taxonomy of Barnett and Duvall (2004). Here, power is 
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understood in two dimensions: first, whether power is exerted by 
individualised actors over other individualised actors (the billiard balls 
metaphor), or whether it results from larger, “constitutive”, social 
relations and is thus not attributable to a single source (Wendt, 1999). 
Secondly, power can act in a direct way or in a diffuse way operating 
more via discourses or generally systems of knowledge or meaning. I 
will conceptualise power over institutional outcomes along these lines. 
I argue, in particular, that power exerted within GPP by industrialised 
countries largely adheres to the “direct” and “causal” category of what 
Barnett and Duvall call “compulsory” power (2004: 13). That is, IP-
relevant economic factors such as market size or innovation rate can 
be translated in rather immediate institutional outcomes on the 
ground. Often, IP relevant provisions are furthermore made part of 
larger package deals in the form of FTAs. Exertion of compulsory 
power can obviously entail legitimacy costs, which is why it is, in the 
present case, used in forums that are less accessible to arguing based 
on equity claims (c.f. Risse, 2000). 
 
In line with my general argument, power exerted by developing 
countries rather pertains to “diffuse” and “causal”, that is, 
“institutional” power, thus influencing institutional outcomes by 
manipulating procedural and formal context-norms and producing 
“unequal leverage in determining collective outcomes” (Barnett and 
Duvall, 2004: 17). Power is thus not exerted directly over another 
actor, but rather shapes the larger (legal, institutional or normative) 
context in which his behaviour plays out. The UN system, in particular, 
has always been recognised for being particularly inclusive while, at 
the same time, strongly emphasising procedural justice over any forms 
of resource-based bargaining. In such a context, comparative 
advantages in institutional power involve utilising the legal, 
institutional and normative set-up of the UN system (as pertaining to 
everything from “hard” international law over administrative 
procedures up to unwritten codes of conduct) to advance one’s own 
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goal (c.f. Najam, 2005). 
 
Actors naturally seek those forums in which they have a comparative 
advantage over their negotiating partners, a phenomenon often 
described as forum–shopping (Alter and Meunier, 2009; Helfer, 2009). 
Institutional change in GPP thus results, on the one hand, from 
industrialised countries shifting their patent policies to the bi- and 
plurilateral level, which necessarily entails creating a broad number of 
additional institutions to obtain maximum legal coverage. 
Simultaneously, such negotiation settings are more conducive towards 
bargaining between participants based on their respective material 
resources, while being less prone to normative arguments as 
commonly seen on the highly politicised and mediatised multilateral 
level. Furthermore, negotiating partners can more easily accept deals 
in such former settings that might appeal to their immediate 
(economic) interests, but that might damage their reputation within a 
larger group setting. Furthermore, the use of small negotiation “clubs” 
makes it easier to reach agreements based on side– payments and 
package–deals. And, finally, the relatively higher lack of transparency 
of club settings makes it easier to exclude potentially disruptive 
parties from the negotiations (c.f. Keohane and Nye, 2001). 
 
Norm-setting by developing countries in the (mainly) UN system, on 
the other hand, is centrally driven by the goal to adjust the global 
patent system for better accommodating developing countries’ needs 
in issues such as access to medicines, global pharmaceutical R&D 
flows, biopiracy, food safety, indigenous rights and others (Muzaka, 
2010). The preference for multilateral negotiations, here, is driven by 
a range of factors. First, multilateral (UN) negotiations offer far better 
opportunities for “naming and shaming” of those actors perceived as 
pursuing narrow self–interests instead of opting for solutions that are 
acceptable across the developmental divide. Secondly, the specific 
normative character of the UN system make it relatively more open to 
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equity–based arguments than international institutions whose scope 
and mandate are focused on rather narrow and technical issues. 
Finally, the UN institutions give an advantage to developing countries 
in terms of (unweighted) voting–rules, informal decision–making 
procedures and a generally high degree of inclusiveness. Accordingly, 
the UN system particularly lends itself towards normative claims, even 
more so when those are embedded into larger discourses such as 
North–South equity or the legacy of colonialism and imperialism. The 
difference to the compulsory mode of power, however, is that 
influence exerted in such a way operates in a rather indirect and 
subtle manner by slowly transforming the context conditions under 
which collective decisions are made. 
4 Institutional Change in Global Patent Politics 
Having established those context–specific differentials in compulsory 
and institutional power, I will now move on to how the coalitions of 
industrialised and developing countries have used their comparative 
advantages for furthering their respective agendas in GPP in the post – 
TRIPS environment. TRIPS formed part of the larger WTO package deal 
that was finalised under the GATTs Uruguay Round in 1994. At that 
time, it was often perceived as a somewhat minor detail in a 
negotiation that was dominated by more salient issues such as market 
access and agricultural subsidies. In 1995, TRIPS, together with WIPO, 
were the only international institutions relevant to patent politics. 
However, the number of bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral 
institutions in the field has significantly increased since then. Table 1 
sums up the major institutional changes between 1995 and 2013. 
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 1995 2013 
Multilateral TRIPS 
WIPO  
TRIPS 
WIPO 
WHO 
FAO 
CBD 
UNESCO 
UNCTAD 
Plurilateral None WCO (failed) 
ACTA (failed) 
NAFTA 
TPP 
EU EPAs with former ACP 
members 
Bilateral None FTAs such as US–Chile, US–South 
Korea, EU–India (under 
negotiation), EU–Chile, EU–
Tunisia, etc.  
   
Table 1: Institutional change in global patent politics from 1995 to 2013 
 
In the following two subsections, I will analyse how industrialised 
countries have been shifting their norm-setting activities to smaller 
club settings on the pluri- and bilateral level, in which their 
compulsory power can be exercised in a comparatively advantageous 
way. Afterwards I turn to developing countries’ norm-setting activities 
in the UN system based on their comparative advantage in institutional 
power in this setting. 
4.1 Compulsory power and patent clubs 
Industrialised countries’ overall approach to GPP is often referred to 
with the term “TRIPS-plus”, which amounts to a further up-scaling of 
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TRIPS’ minimum standards while reducing existing flexibility 
mechanisms and safeguards (Sell, 2011). That is, the US and, to a 
lesser extent, the European Union (EU), have been systematically 
integrating IP – and patent – relevant provisions into smaller club 
settings on the bilateral and plurilateral level, i.e. requiring from their 
negotiating partners longer patent durations for certain sectors of 
technology, data protection for clinical test trials, narrowing down of 
existing TRIPS safeguard mechanisms and flexibilities and so forth. 
This approach to GPP emerged when, in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, WTO multilateralism became increasingly obstructed. Patents 
formed only a small (but significant) part of the overall trade 
negotiations under the 2001 Doha Development Round, yet 
developing countries strongly resisted any further up-scaling of TRIPS’ 
minimum standards. As the deadlock of the Doha Round became 
increasingly obvious, the US and, to a lesser extent, the EU, began 
incorporating provisions relating to patents (and other IPRs) into 
bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). A recent study covering all 28 
EU and US FTAs with WTO members existing as of 2009 finds that all 
of those include obligations in TRIPS-plus areas aimed at raising TRIPS’ 
minimum standards or reducing current flexibilities, with 27 of those 
being enforceable through various dispute settlement proceedings 
(Horn et al., 2010). Such obligations can be quite different in nature; 
i.e. the US–Peru FTA contains provisions on data exclusivity for 
agricultural (10 years) and pharmaceutical test data (5 years), non-
pharmaceutical patent term extension, changing legal grounds for 
patent revocation, and so on (Biadgleng and Maur, 2011: 3), the US–
Jordan FTA restricts flexibilities on compulsory licensing, while 
increases to maximum patent term length form part of the EU–South 
Korea FTA (article 10 – 35.2). The current US proposal for the Trans–
Pacific Partnership (TPP) presently under negotiation between the US 
and a number of pacific states (such as Australia, Chile, Singapore and 
Mexico) contains TRIPS–plus provisions that go “far beyond definition 
of patentability contained in TRIPS Art. 27.1” and could “require 
  Florian Rabitz  
 
23 
countries to open flood gates to patent applications on minor 
modifications or variations of existing chemical entities; on new uses 
or methods of using existing medicines, or on new formulations, 
dosages, and combinations” (Flynn et al., 2011: 20). As has been 
noted, the US strategy is rather explicitly based on the idea of a 
domino–effect, in which bilateral and regional TRIPS–plus standards 
were expected to be “multilateralised” as non– parties also adopt the 
new regulations, a strategy that has been, however, rather 
unsuccessful (Morin, 2009). The EU approach to GPP is centrally built 
around the notion that existing substantial rules under TRIPS are 
largely adequate as of present, but that the chief issue currently is an 
unsatisfactory enforcement of those rules. In this manner, the EU 
strategy mainly focuses on enforcement over attempting to add new 
substantial rules to the existing TRIPS minimum standards. In 2005, 
the EU adopted its global IP enforcement strategy (EU, 2005), which 
argued that although TRIPS minimum standards were increasingly 
implemented in third countries, enforcement of those standards was 
undesirably low. In 2007, the European Commission proposed that 
such IP enforcement become a central issue in FTA negotiations, 
aiming to use FTAs for “setting international IP norms and standards 
that cannot be realised under the WTO framework, also with a 
particular view towards preparing the ground for standard-setting on 
the WTO level when talks there pick up again” (Jaeger, 2010: 9-10). In 
further contrast to the US, which has often been relying on overt 
coercion and trade sanctions for promoting its IP and patent agenda, 
the EU “has been more willing to use more persuasive governmental 
tactics such as education campaigns, incentives and technical 
assistance” (Robinson and Gibson, 2011:1905). The EU has been 
integrating TRIPS–plus provisions into a broad range of Association 
Agreements (AAs). For example, such bilateral treaties with a number 
of Arab states contain provisions for early exhaustion of transition 
periods under TRIPS; require the EUs negotiating partners to join 
certain international treaties which contain provisions going beyond 
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the TRIPS agreement; or generally require them to adopt the “highest” 
international standards for patents and IPRs (such as in the EU–Tunisia 
AA), which is obviously a relative term that might change as TRIPS–
plus standards proliferate in the international system (El Said, 2007). 
The EU has also been negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPA) with the different regional groups that together form the ACP–
cluster. So far, only one EPA has been concluded with the CARIFORUM 
group, containing several provisions on TRIPS-plus measures. In the 
(as of early 2013) ongoing negotiations on an EU–India FTA, TRIPS-plus 
issues related to patent term extension (up to 25 years in total), 
enforcement measures and data exclusivity for clinical studies have 
been on the agenda for some years now (TWN, 2012), although it is 
currently unclear what precise role they will play in any final 
agreement.  
 
Looking beyond FTAs, a number of (both successful and failed) 
initiatives on patent enforcement have been undertaken by EU and US 
in non–trade related forums in recent years. Within the WHO, talks 
have been ongoing for a few years now on how to protect consumers 
from so-called “counterfeit medicines”. While most definitions of such 
medicines, including the one officially adopted by the WHO, generally 
refer to medicines that are “deliberately and fraudulently mislabeled 
with respect to identity and/or source”, several industrialised countries 
designate medicines merely violating patents as already being 
“counterfeit” (WHO, 2013). That is, while the official WHO definition 
refers to medicines that do not work in the appropriate therapeutic 
way and might even have negative impacts on health, industrialised 
countries such as the US would be able to include generic medicines, 
differing from patent–protected medicines only in the legal sense, 
under the “counterfeit” label. Under such a definition, obviously, any 
action against counterfeit medicines on the basis of concerns about 
public health would simultaneously be a way of enforcing 
pharmaceutical patents vis-à-vis producers of generic drugs, such as in 
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India. 
 
Finally, patent–related provisions have formed minor parts of several 
initiatives mainly concerned with enforcement of copyrights and 
trademarks, such as the Anti–Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 
the World Customs Union (WCO) SECURE initiative (both failed), or the 
WHOs IMPACT taskforce (Sell, 2010). What virtually all of the cases 
mentioned above have in common is the return to negotiation settings 
based on a lack of transparency and insulated clubs that do not enjoy 
the same degree of international legitimacy as is the case in classic 
multilateral settings (Keohane and Nye, 2001). As negotiations on 
ACTA and the TPP have exemplary shown, it is quite often unclear in 
the eyes of the world public what is being discussed in such forums. 
Negotiations on ACTA were, for the longest time, shielded even from 
members of the European Parliament; and US proposals on the IP 
chapter of the TPP did not become public until being leaked by 
individual US negotiators. Clearly, though, what those club settings 
lack in international legitimacy, they make up for in efficiency 
regarding the ease of negotiations and the less normatively charged 
environment. While this might contribute to more outcome–oriented 
bargaining over symbolically charged negotiations along entrenched 
positions, the ability by industrialised countries to pick and choose 
those developing countries that are admitted into the respective club 
crucially allows forms of bargaining that are based on political and 
economic asymmetries, and accordingly are regarded skeptically by 
developing country actors. 
4.2 Institutional power and UN multilateralism 
Developing countries’ preferred negotiating environment is in one 
central way the opposite of the patent clubs discussed in the 
preceding section. Focusing their norm–setting activities mainly on the 
UN system, a rather high degree of international legitimacy is here 
combined with a rather low effectiveness on the outcome level. 
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Developing countries have succeeded, in recent years, to integrate 
patent–related issues and policies into a wide range of multilateral UN 
institutions, with the ultimate goal of using the global patent system 
in a way that would accommodate a range of concerns specifically 
voiced by developing countries in areas as diverse as cultural rights, 
food safety, sovereignty over national resources or public health. 
 
Sell and Odell argue that developing countries’ success in achieving 
progress on the issue cannot readily be explained in terms of 
economic or market power, but rather that endogenous discursive 
factors can crucially favour “weak-state coalitions” through processes 
of global mediatisation (Odell and Sell, 2006). While Morin and Gold 
acknowledge that discursive and processual factors have significantly 
influenced political outcomes, they rather attribute this to actors’ 
“rhetorical entrapment” (Morin and Gold, 2010). And yet other work 
acknowledges the causal role that “frames” played in making what I 
refer to here as compulsory power relatively less efficient vis-à-vis 
institutional power (Muzaka, 2011, Sell and Prakash, 2004, c.f. Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1981). However, while we would expect such issues to 
have a comparatively higher degree of international legitimacy than, 
say, rent–seeking by pharmaceutical MNCs, substantial outcomes are 
rather limited. That is, while the UN system is particularly open to the 
voicing of developing countries’ interests within a normative frame, 
decision–making procedures usually make it rather easy for 
industrialised countries to blunt the edges of any far–reaching 
proposals developing countries might voice. Since about 2001 and 
coinciding with the WTO Doha Declaration, developing countries have 
attempted to infuse a broad range of UN institutions with patent – 
related issues in line with a generally “developmentalist” patent 
agenda. The political centre–piece of this approach is WIPOs 
Development Agenda, first proposed in 2004 and adopted (in the form 
of 45 non–binding recommendations) in 2007 by the WIPO General 
Assembly. The Development Agenda spells out the larger contours of 
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a developmentalist approach to GPP, in which global norm–setting 
would take into account the needs of developing countries more 
strongly (De Beer, 2009), while specific proposals range from rather 
pragmatic modifications of existing rules under WIPO to rather broad 
and fundamental challenges to the current global IP system. 
 
However, WIPO is by far not the only forum in which developing 
countries have engaged. For example, at the same time as 
industrialised countries are pushing for anti–counterfeiting measures 
in WHO, developing countries are using the very same institution to 
discuss measures on how to adapt the global patent system so that 
more resources are, globally, channeled into R&D on diseases 
predominantly affecting the Global South (i.e. so–called Type II and 
Type III diseases like Malaria, HIV/AIDS, Dengue or Tuberculosis). 
Developing countries’ concerns regarding biopiracy, discussed above, 
have resulted in substantial efforts to push for a legally binding 
international agreement on genetic resources within the framework of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), culminating in the 
adoption of the CBDs Nagoya Protocol in October 2010. Within WIPO, 
long and arduous negotiations have been ongoing for over 10 years 
on how to specifically protect the Traditional Knowledge of indigenous 
and local communities from practices of biopiracy. 
 
While issues such as access to medicines or biopiracy generally enjoy a 
high degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the world public, substantial 
outcomes are extremely limited, though. While the 2001 Doha Public 
Health Declaration arguably improved the global regulatory framework 
in favour of developing countries, the deadlock of the WTO Doha 
Round has made any further progress on this issue contingent on an 
(as of presently, rather unlikely) revitalisation of WTO multilateralism. 
And while developing countries can utilise their comparative 
advantage in institutional power within the UN framework to shape the 
larger context conditions of multilateral negotiations, consensual UN 
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decision–making procedures make it rather easy for industrialised 
countries to block developing countries’ advances that go beyond the 
symbolic level into the realm of substantial norm–setting. 
5 Conclusions 
This article has approached institutional change in GPP under a 
coalition– centred perspective, arguing that the phenomenon is 
ultimately due to context–specific norm–setting activities of 
industrialised and developing countries. In particular, I argued that 
industrialised countries seek out those forums in which they can 
translate their economic advantages into political outcomes without 
incurring undesirably high legitimacy costs; and that developing 
countries have been focusing on multilateral forums within the UN 
system, where they enjoy advantages both in terms of legitimacy and 
of institutional structure. In this conclusion, I will make some 
propositions on how the above relates to larger debates in 
institutionalist International Relations (IR) scholarship, where a lot of 
research has in recent years focused on increases in the institutional 
population of the international system (Alter and Meunier, 2009; 
Raustiala and Victor, 2004; Raustiala, 2012). Beyond the case 
discussed in the present paper, this phenomenon has recently gained 
in prevalence in the international system, and a broad range of cases 
have been identified in the literature, in issue areas ranging from 
climate change (Keohane and Victor, 2009) over energy politics 
(Colgan et al., 2011) to food security (Margulis, 2013) and maritime 
piracy (Struett et al., 2013). With a few noteworthy exceptions (i.e. 
Morin and Orsini, 2013), those have predominantly focused on the 
effects of such new institutional arrangements, often dubbed “regime 
complexes” (Raustiala and Victor, 2004), while often neglecting to 
inquire into the origins of the phenomenon. 
 
So what general lessons might be drawn from the case analysed in this 
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paper about the origins of such new institutional arrangements? On 
the basis of the above, I first suggest that it is a particular combination 
of persistent political conflict between actors, each having high norm–
setting capacities, that can drive institutional developments as 
sketched out above. The presence of persistent conflict compels actors 
to seek out institutional solutions in line with their general interests, 
while high norm–setting capacities allow them to implement those 
solutions under otherwise adversarial conditions. Second, such 
strategic use of international institutions can take on the form of 
repeated interaction between actors, as institutional strategies are 
adopted to those of other actors. If conflict remains intractable, this 
may cause a self– reinforcing dynamic of institutional proliferation and 
change. Indeed, the literature on regime complexity widely 
acknowledges the stability, monotonous growth and path dependency 
of such institutional arrangements (Oberthuer and Stokke, 2011). As 
international institutions rarely disappear once they have been 
created, continuing strategic interaction between states would thus 
create a heap of institutions as a by–product. However, the case 
discussed in this paper is rather peculiar in one crucial dimension, 
which is the extraordinarily high homogeneity of actors’ interests and 
identities, which led me to adopt a coalition–centred perspective in the 
first place. Generalising to other cases on this basis might pose 
difficulties, if heterogeneity of interests and identities makes the 
demarcation lines of political conflict less clear–cut, and also reduces 
actors’ respective norm– setting capacities. Nevertheless, 
systematically taking into account an actor– centred perspective (either 
state- or coalition-level) appears to be a fruitful way of balancing the 
scholarly debate on regime complexity and fragmentation by going 
beyond mere effects and implications of such new institutional 
arrangements and, instead, focusing more on their empirical origins. 
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